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Abstract 
This paper develops a Bertrand Price Competition model with differentiated goods in which 
export subsidies are compared to exchange rate depreciation as different government 
policies for promoting exports. National governments may wish to help domestic firms to 
expand market shares in profitable areas and might do this through either one of these two 
tools. Their effects on equilibrium values are analyzed and compared. It is shown that while 
the two examined trade policies give rise to the same highest welfare, they could produce 
some significant differences according to circumstances. If the exchange rate is sufficiently 
high and the level of the nominal wage sufficiently low, the marginal effect of the subsidy will 
be higher. But if unions are strong (and demand a high nominal wage) and the exchange rate 
is sufficiently low, the governments could also consider a depreciation as an alternative policy 
to export subsidies. 
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1 Introduction
Export subsidies and exchange rate depreciation are two most obvious tools for
export promotion. Traditionally, these two tools are the mostly used trade poli-
cies for increasing exports and for helping the trade balance. Because improving
exports is a vital problem for a small developing country, it is important to answer
the question what is the best way to do it?
This question is very interesting also because there seems not to be much lit-
erature trying to compare the two policy tools. There is much literature about
export subsidies but there seems not to be much literature about exchange rate
depreciation and even less literature comparing it to export subsidies.
The classic international trade theory provides a strong and robust welfare ar-
gument against export subsidies. The main loss from export subsidies is the
so-called "terms of trade loss", which appears due to the worsening in the terms
of trade (the price of a country's exports divided by the price of its imports) of
the domestic country. Adding up the e®ects, an export subsidy unambiguously
leads to costs that exceeds its bene¯ts.1
Yet, Brander and Spencer (1985) showed that export subsidies can be pro¯table
from a domestic point of view. In a very simple Cournot-duopoly model they
showed that export subsidies, which enable the domestic ¯rm to capture a larger
share of a pro¯table international market share, can be attractive for the domestic
country. The main idea of the article is that the government subsidy alters the
successive noncooperative equilibrium in the inter-¯rm rivalry in favor of the
domestic ¯rm by giving it a cost advantage over the competitor that deters him
from entering the market. This argument for industrial policy based on imperfect
competition is often referred to as the "strategic trade policy" argument.
This argument has attracted much interest but it also received much criticism.
It is important to remind the main critical arguments against export subsidies
in order to explain why the government might take into consideration also other
policy tools for export promotion.
The ¯rst point of critique refers to the unavailability of information. The problem
of insu±cient information has two aspects. The ¯rst concerns information about
the subsidized industry and the second concerns information about the other
industries with whom the subsidized industry competes for resources. If one
industry is subsidized, it will draw resources from other industries and lead to
increases in their costs. To decide whether the policy is justi¯ed or not the
government needs to weight all e®ects, and even if it had a precise understanding
of one industry it needs equally precise understanding of those industries with
which that industry competes for resources. This information is very unlikely to
1See for instance Krugman and Obstfeld (1994).
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be available.2
The second critique point refers to foreign retaliation. Strategic trade policies are
so-called "beggar-thy-neighbor policies" that increase domestic welfare at other
countries' expense and therefore risk a trade war that leaves everyone worse o®.
The third critique point is concerned with political misuse. Once a procedure of
market intervention is established, it might be susceptible to political pressure
of special interest groups. Experience shows that trade policy fails to take into
account the interest of consumers and usually serves only the interest of those
fortunate enough to gain favor. "The invisible hand of the economic market could
then be replaced by the even more invisible hand of the political market."3
These points of critique to export subsidies and many others (like targeting,
unfavorable income distribution, etc.) are very well summarized in an article
by Gene M. Grossman called "Strategic Export Promotion: A Critique" (1992).
Grossman suggests that government could help exports by other measures like
support of education and industrial R&D, redeployment of resources released
from declining industries, favorous (software) taxes or macroeconomic policies
like lower interest rates for investment or depreciation of overvalued exchange
rates.
As some Eastern European Countries have an overvalued exchange rate and at
the same time mean to subsidize exports (although they want to become mem-
bers of the European Community, which prohibits this), I found it interesting to
make a comparative welfare analysis between export subsidies and exchange rate
depreciation.The main results are that the optimal export subsidy and the opti-
mal exchange rate depreciation give the same level of welfare but their marginal
e®ects might di®er according to circumstances.The subsidy and the exchange rate
depreciation are not always equivalent. Under certain particular conditions one
tool might have a greater marginal e®ect than the other.
The paper proceeds as follows: In section 2, I present the model. Next, I solve
the game by backward induction and begin with the consumers (section 3). After
solving the consumer problem and getting the direct demand functions I present
the producers problem (section 4). Next, I look at the welfare maximization of
the government (section 5). In the last section I present some conclusions.
2For an analysis of the "informational" criticism of the strategic-trade-policy theory see also
Maggi (1996).
3As G. M. Grossman (1992) noticed.
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2 The Model
The analysis will be done with the use of a Bertrand model similar to the "third-
market model" used by Brander and Spencer. The main di®erences to their
model refer to price competition and product di®erentiation.4
Consider the following situation:
There are two countries A and B each with one government and one ¯rm. The
two ¯rms, produce a substitutable but di®erentiated good from that produced by
the rival.5 Each ¯rm produces both for the domestic and for the foreign market.
The subsidy is paid only for the quantity exported (speci¯c export subsidy). The
two ¯rms compete upon prices. The technology is such that labor is the only
input. One unit of input gives one unit of output (constant returns to scale).
The workers are paid in the local currency. The governments have to simulta-
neously set the exchange rate against a third reference currency, say the USD.
From this, their relative exchange rate will be set.6
In each country there is a representative consumer who works (and earns a nom-
inal wage that is exogenously given) and buys the two goods produced by the
¯rms.
So each country is represented by three agents:
* one government,
* one ¯rm,
* one representative consumer.
The order of moves in this three-stage model is the following:
In a ¯rst stage, the governments simultaneously set their exchange rate against
the third currency or alternatively a speci¯c (per unit) export subsidy s (in USD)
in order to maximize welfare. Welfare is de¯ned as the utility of the consumer
plus the pro¯t of the ¯rm (see equation (22)).
In the second stage, given the exchange rate (or alternatively the export subsidy)
chosen by the government, the ¯rms compete upon prices. From the ¯rst-order
conditions of pro¯t maximization, the reaction functions and then the equilibrium
prices are derived.
4For surprising results in regard of how Brander's and Spencer's results could change in
an Bertrand environment without product di®erentiation see Eaton, Jonathan and Grossman
(1986).
5For the relation between product di®erentiation, market structure and exchange rate pass
through see Martin S. and Phlips L. (1995), and Kirman A. and Phlips L. (1996).
6Say for example that the relative exchange rate of country A is ea =price of 1 USD in
the currency of the country A (8400 Lei for 1 USD if A is Romania) and the exchange rate of
country B is eb =price of 1 USD in the currency of the country B (12 ATS for 1 USD if B is
Austria).
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In the third stage, the consumers, given their nominal wages and all the variables
set in the previous stages, determine the optimal quantity that maximizes their
utility.
Solving the game by backward induction, I start with the third stage, the utility
maximization of consumers.
3 The Consumer Problem
3.1 Utility Maximization in Country A
The consumers of country A choose quantities x and y¤ in order to maximize the
following quasilinear utility function:7
UA(x; y
¤;m) = U(x; y¤) +m
subject to the following budget constraint:
xpx + y
¤py +m =
wa
ea
(x+ x¤)¡ sx¤
where:
x =quantity of good 1 produced for the domestic market (in country A)
x¤ =quantity of good 1 produced in A for export
y =quantity of good 2 produced for the domestic market (in country B)
y¤ =quantity of good 2 produced in B for export
m = demand for the numeraire good in country A
wa =the nominal wage of workers in country A (¯xed)
ea =the relative exchange rate in country A (in Lei/USD)
and everything is expressed in the reference currency (USD) except for the nom-
inal wage wa.
They consume quantity x of the goods produced domestically (and pay px per
unit) and quantity y¤ of the goods produced in country B, for which they pay py
per unit. They also consume the numeraire good m (with unit price).
7As the utility function is quasilinear, there will be no income e®ect.
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Consumers earn a wage of wa
ea
for the whole amount produced domestically (x+x¤)
and have to pay the subsidy s (for the exported goods x¤).
I assume that consumers are taxed by a lump sum tax by the government. If
the government has a balanced budget constraint, then the amount of the lump
sum tax must be equal to the amount of the subsidy that the government wants
to pay to the ¯rm. Under such conditions, the government is only a veil and in
practice it is as if the consumer pays the subsidy directly to the ¯rm.
Furthermore the consumers are permanent residents of a country and cannot
change residence. Because they have to pay the subsidy in the domestic country
the workers/consumers will have an incentive to emigrate to the foreign country
and work there. So I assume that the foreign country does not allow such an
immigration (or that the domestic country does not allow an emigration).8
Preferences towards the choice among the two goods under consideration are
represented by a quadratic utility function of the following form:9
U(x; y¤)A = ®(x+ y¤)¡ 1
2
(¯x2 + 2°xy¤ + ¯y¤2) (1)
with ® > 0; ¯ >j ° j¸ 0: The goods are substitutes, independent, or complements
according to whether ° 0. When ¯ = ° the goods are perfect substitutes. °
¯
goes from 1 to -1.
In order to have substitutes we need ° > 0 )j ° j= ° ) ¯ > °:
In order to have a strictly positive marginal utility (a monotonic increasing utility
function) we need to impose the following:
Ux = ®¡ ¯x¡ °y¤ > 0; Uy¤ = ®¡ °x¡ ¯y¤ > 0. From this we get the following
conditions: if x < ®
¯+°
then y¤ · ®¡¯x
°
and if x > ®
¯+°
then y¤ · ®¡°x
¯
.10
The simple quadratic utility function expressed in equation (1) allows us to get
the following linear demands:
px = ®¡ ¯x¡ °y¤
py = ®¡ °x¡ ¯y¤
8If we think of the foreign country as an EU country and the domestic country as one of the
former Communist Block (Eastern European Country), this assumption is not unrealistic.
9This form of quadratic utility function is frequently used. See for example: Xavier Vives
(1984).
10Note that for ® = ¯ = 1; ° = 0; 5 and x = y¤ = 1 we get U(1; 1) = 0; 5 and U(2; 2) = ¡2
and the utility function would not be monotonically increasing in quantity.
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And assuming now a = ®
¯+°
b = ¯
¯2¡°2 and c =
°
¯2¡°2 we get the following linear
direct demand functions:
x = a¡ bpx + cpy (2)
y¤ = a¡ bpy + cpx (3)
m = I ¡ a(px + py) + b(p2x + p2y)¡ 2cpxpy
where I = wa
ea
(x+ x¤)¡ sx¤ is the total income of the representative consumer in
country A.
From the condition of substitutability we get the result that a; b; c > 0 and b > c.
This condition is also satis¯ed because of strategic complementarity. The strate-
gic complementarity condition just says that the e®ect of a change in the own
price (px) must be higher than the e®ect of a change in the price of the other
good (py¤).
3.2 Utility Maximization in Country B
The representative consumer in country B choose y and x¤ in order to maximize
a similar quasilinear utility function:
UB(x
¤; y;m¤) = U(x¤; y) +m¤
subject to the following budget constraint:
x¤px + ypy +m¤ =
wb
eb
(y + y¤)
with
wb = nominal wage of workers in country B (¯xed),
eb = relative exchange rate of country B (in ATS/USD),
6
m¤ = demand for the numeraire good in country B
and
U(x¤; y)B = ®(x¤ + y)¡ 1
2
(¯x¤2 + 2°x¤y + ¯y2) (4)
The only di®erence is that workers/consumers in country B do not pay the sub-
sidy.
If we now again solve the maximization problem (by setting MRS = pi
pj
) and
substitute for ®, ¯, °, we get the following linear demand functions for the rep-
resentative consumer in country B:
x¤ = a¡ bpx + cpy (5)
y = a¡ bpy + cpx (6)
which are just the same as equation (2) and equation (3).
By inspection of equations (2), (3), (5) and (6) it is easy to see that it must be
that:
x = x¤ and y¤ = y.
We are now ready to look at the ¯rm's competition.
4 Price Competition between Firms
4.1 The Pro¯t Functions
Firms compete upon prices (Bertrand Price Competition) given the demand of
the consumers in order to maximize the following pro¯t functions:
¼A = xpx + x
¤px ¡ wa
ea
(x+ x¤) + sx¤ (7)
¼B = ypy + y
¤py ¡ wb
eb
(y + y¤) (8)
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I assume that everything is expressed in the reference currency (the USD). So
consumers have to purchase all the goods (not only the imported ones) in USD
but receive their wages in the local currency.
The two ¯rms earn revenue from the goods they produce ( (x+x¤) for ¯rm A and
(y + y¤) for ¯rm B) and have to pay their workers the wages wa
ea
and wb
eb
. Firm A
also receives a speci¯c subsidy for each unit it is exporting to country B (sx¤).
In order to get a higher export subsidy the ¯rm would also have an incentive to
declare a higher x¤. I have assumed that the government is able to distinguish
between x and x¤.11
Anticipating that the demand is the same in both countries the two pro¯t func-
tions can be written simpli¯ed as follows:
¼A = x(px; py)(2px ¡ 2wa
ea
+ s)
¼B = 2y(px; py)(py ¡ wb
eb
)
4.2 First-Order Conditions
The First-Order Conditions are:
@¼A
@px
= ¡b(2px ¡ 2wa
ea
+ s) + 2(a¡ bpx + cpy) = 0
@¼B
@py
= ¡b(py ¡ wb
eb
) + a¡ bpy + cpx = 0
yielding reaction functions:
11There is evidence that for example during the seventies Italian exporters tried to declare
more exports by ¯lling up empty boxes and transporting them over the border in order to get a
higher subsidy. This could also be made in agreement with the importing ¯rm, and then share
the pro¯t of the subsidy. So the government must have the possibility to control at the border
how much the domestic ¯rm really exports (to know how much x¤ really is).
8
px =
c
2b
py +
wa
2ea
+
a
2b
¡ s
4
(9)
py =
c
2b
px +
wa
2eb
+
a
2b
(10)
So, the two reaction functions are symmetric with the only di®erence that the
¯rst one contains the subsidy.
4.3 The Equilibrium Prices
Calculating the intersection point of the reaction functions (equation (9) and
equation (10)), we get the following equilibrium prices:
px =
1
4b2 ¡ c2
µ
¡b2s+ bcwb
eb
+ 2b2
wa
ea
¶
+
a
2b¡ c (11)
py =
1
4b2 ¡ c2
µ
¡bc
2
s+ 2b2
wb
eb
+ bc
wa
ea
¶
+
a
2b¡ c (12)
Now, we can calculate the e®ects of the subsidy and the exchange rate deprecia-
tion.
Di®erentiating equation (11) ¯rst with respect to the subsidy (s) and then with
respect to the exchange rate (ea) we get:
@px
@s
= ¡ b
2
4b2 ¡ c2
@px
@ea
= ¡ 2b
2wa
(4b2 ¡ c2)e2a
The ¯rst observation is that both e®ects have the same sign. Both the subsidy
and the exchange rate depreciation lead to a reduction of the price of the good
produced in the domestic country. They act for the domestic ¯rm like a reduction
in the marginal cost.
The second observation is that the subsidy is not fully passed over to the con-
sumers because:
9
@px
@s
=
¡b2
4b2 ¡ c2 =
¡1
4¡ c2
b2
> ¡1 )j @px
@s
j< 1
b > c and a; b; c > 0.
This means that an increase of the subsidy of one dollar reduces the price of the
good produced by the ¯rm that receives the subsidy by less than one dollar, so a
part of the subsidy increases the pro¯t margin of the ¯rm, due to its oligopolistic
power.
The third observation is that:
@px
@ea
@px
@s
=
2wa
e2a
(13)
This says that the e®ect of the depreciation compared with the e®ect of the
subsidy on the price increases (in absolute value) with wa
e2a
. The higher the wage,
the higher the e®ect on price of the depreciation compared to the e®ect of the
subsidy and the higher the exchange rate the lower the e®ect of the depreciation
compared to the e®ect of the subsidy.
The e®ects on the price of the foreign ¯rm are somehow similar and can be
calculated from equation (12):
@py
@s
= ¡ bc
2(4b2 ¡ c2) (14)
@py
@ea
= ¡ bcwa
(4b2 ¡ c2)e2 (15)
We can observe that both e®ects are negative and smaller than the e®ects on
the own price.12 So the subsidy and the depreciation reduce also the price in the
foreign country but to a smaller extent.13
From equation (14) and equation (15) we can see that if the goods are independent
(c = 0), the subsidy and the depreciation have no e®ect on the price of the
12From the equations above we get that:
@py
@s
@px
@s
=
@py
@ea
@px
@ea
= c2b < 1 since b; c > 0; b > c.
13This is what we would have expected. That the e®ect on the own price is greater than the
e®ect on the price of the competitor.
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competitor (py). In this case, even if there is a subsidy, the competitor has no
incentive to reduce the price.14
The magnitude of the e®ect of the depreciation compared to the e®ect of the
subsidy depends again on the "wage" in the reference currency.
@py
@ea
@py
@s
=
2wa
e2a
The higher the nominal wage and the lower the exchange rate, the stronger the
e®ect of the depreciation compared to that of the subsidy.
Next, I am going to look at the e®ect on the exchanged quantity.
4.4 The E®ect on Equilibrium Quantities
Substituting the price equations in the direct demand functions (equation (2) and
equation (3)), we get the exchanged quantities of the two goods depending only
on the desired parameters (a; b; c; ea; eb; wa; wb; s):
x =
1
4b2 ¡ c2
·
b(2b2 ¡ c2)
2
s+ b2c
wb
eb
¡ b(2b2 ¡ c2)wa
ea
¸
+
ab
2b¡ c (16)
y =
1
4b2 ¡ c2
·
¡b
2c
2
s¡ b(2b2 ¡ c2)wb
eb
+ b2c
wa
ea
¸
+
ab
2b¡ c (17)
Now we can look at the e®ects of the subsidy and of the depreciation. Di®eren-
tiating equation (16) with respect to s and ea we get the e®ects on x:
@x
@s
=
b(2b2 ¡ c2)
2(4b2 ¡ c2)
@x
@ea
=
b(2b2 ¡ c2)wa
(4b2 ¡ c2)e2a
So, both the subsidy and the exchange rate depreciation increase x. This is
not that obvious. If we look at the demand equation (2), we see that we have
two opposing e®ects. The reduction in the own price (px) increases x but the
14You can see this also from the demand equation (3). If you set c = 0, then the demand of
the second good does not depend on the price of the ¯rst good anymore.
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reduction in the price of the competitor (py) decreases x. Since the price of x
falls (due to the subsidy or the depreciation) x rises but because of competitive
substitutability also the price of the other good falls and also y rises. This reduces
the demand for x. But we have seen that px is falling than py and we also know
that b > c, so the own e®ect is stronger and x rises.
The e®ects on y are:
@y
@s
= ¡ b
2c
2(4b2 ¡ c2)
@y
@ea
= ¡ b
2cwa
(4b2 ¡ c2)e2a
We can observe that both e®ects are negative. If we look again at the demand
equation (6), we can see that the own price reduction would make y increase, but
the reduction of the price of the competitive good makes y fall. The e®ect on
px is so much greater than the e®ect on py that even the fact that b > c cannot
compensate for this and y falls. Because of the asymmetry in the prices py is so
much less a®ected that the e®ect of px prevails and y falls.
Again, the e®ect on y is smaller (in absolute value) than that on x.15 This is
what we would have expected. Since the e®ect on the own price dominates, also
the e®ect on the own quantity (x) must be greater than the e®ect on the foreign
quantity (y).
Comparing the e®ects of the subsidy and the depreciation we obtain for both
quantities the same result as before:
@x
@ea
@x
@s
=
@y
@ea
@y
@s
=
2wa
e2a
Again, the magnitude of the e®ect of the depreciation compared to the e®ect of
the subsidy seems to increase with the level of the nominal wage and decrease
with the e®ect of the exchange rate.
A very interesting result is that concerning both the prices and the demand the
signs of the two e®ects are the same. So the subsidy and the depreciation have
the same e®ect. Only their magnitude di®ers.
15
@y
@s
@x
@s
=
@y
@ea
@x
@ea
= ¡bc2b2¡c2 =
¡ cb
2¡ c2
b2
<j 1 j since b > c ) cb < 1
12
sign
µ
@µ
@s
¶
= sign
µ
@µ
@ea
¶
(18)
µ = px; py; x; y
Comparing the magnitude of the e®ect of the two tools (subsidy versus exchange
rate depreciation) for the domestic and the foreign pro¯t we obtain the same
result as before. The exchange rate depreciation increases pro¯t more than the
subsidy only for a high nominal wage and a low exchange rate.
@¼A
@ea
@¼A
@s
=
@¼B
@ea
@¼B
@s
=
2wa
e2a
This result is valid also for the e®ects on the utility of the consumers (see Ap-
pendix A.3).
In the next stage we are going to look at the welfare maximization of the gov-
ernment.
5 The Government Problem
5.1 Comparing the Two Tools
Solving the problem by backward induction we have come to the last stage, the
welfare maximization of the government.
As discussed at the beginning, the government is maximizing a "welfare function"
of the form:
W = CS|{z}
Consumer Surplus
+ PS|{z}
Producer Surplus
Here I measure the Consumer Surplus as the net utility of the representative
consumer (equation (24)) and the Producer Surplus as the pro¯t of the ¯rms
(equation (7)).
The government has two tools. It either can choose the subsidy level s or the ex-
change rate ea. The government is able to act ¯rst and set subsidy/exchange rate
levels, using its understanding of how this will in°uence the prices in equilibrium.
A very important assumption is that the government understands everything that
will occur afterwards and takes these anticipations into consideration at the mo-
ment of setting the trade policy (export subsidy or exchange rate depreciation).
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In comparing the two tools, we obtained the following two main results:
sign
µ
@µ
@s
¶
= sign
µ
@µ
@ea
¶
and
@µ
@ea
@µ
@s
=
2wa
e2a
(19)
where µ = px; py; x; y; ¼A; ¼B; UA; UB.
So, the e®ect of the two tools goes in the same direction but their magnitude
di®ers depending on the nominal wage wa and on the exchange rate ea.
From equation (19) we can see that:
if wa ! 1 then
@µ
@ea
@µ
@s
! 1
if ea ! 0 then
@µ
@ea
@µ
@s
! 1
if wa ! 0 then
@µ
@ea
@µ
@s
! 0
if ea ! 1 then
@µ
@ea
@µ
@s
! 0
So, we can see that if the exchange rate is not very high, the depreciation would
do better than the subsidy. The higher the level of the exchange rate ea, the
lower the advantage of the depreciation. This means that a depreciation makes
sense only at the beginning (like a demand shock) but its usefulness decreases as
its level increases.
The magnitude of the e®ect of the depreciation compared to the e®ect of the
subsidy also depends on the level of the nominal wage wa. If there is a strong
union with strong monopoly power, the exchange rate depreciation is better than
the subsidy because it reduces the power of the union by reducing the workers'
wage in terms of the international currency. This means that if the ¯rm is to weak
to bargain with the union, it would be better for the government to depreciate
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in order to take the advantage from the union away and redistribute it to the
consumer (through lower prices).
In many Eastern European Countries one can observe strong trade unions. In
order to improve the competitiveness of their exports (lower prices), the govern-
ments should therefore use the exchange rate depreciation as an economic tool.
5.2 Optimal Values
Solving the utility function with respect to the subsidy and the exchange rate we
obtain the following optimal values:
s¤ =
2(2ac5eaeb + 12b
6waeb + 3b
4c(4aea ¡ 3cwa)eb + b2c3(¡12aea + cwa)eb)
b2(12b4 ¡ 9b2c2 + c4)eaeb
+
2(b3c2ea(5cwb ¡ 7aeb) + bc4ea(¡cwb + aeb) + 4b5(¡2ceawb + aeaeb))
b2(12b4 ¡ 9b2c2 + c4)eaeb (20)
e¤a =
2b2(12b4 ¡ 9b2c2 + c4)waeb
B
(21)
B = ¡4ac5eb + 12b6seb + b2c3(24a+ cs)eb ¡ 3b4c(8a+ 3cs)eb ¡
¡2b3c2(5cwb ¡ 7aeb) + 2bc4(cwb ¡ aeb) + 8b5(2cwb ¡ aeb)
If we substitute these values in the pro¯t function (equation (23)) and in the
utility function (equation (24)), we obtain the following results:
¼A(e
¤
a) = ¼A(s
¤)
UA(e
¤
a) = UA(s
¤)
And since the welfare is just the sum of the two, it means that:
WA(e
¤
a) = UA(e
¤
a) + ¼A(e
¤
a) = WA(s
¤) = UA(s¤) + ¼A(s¤) (22)
For the derivation of these results see Appendix A.4 .
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This just means that in this model at optimum the exchange rate depreciation is
exactly analogous to giving a subsidy. The export subsidy and the depreciation
are equivalent. This is because the depreciation just means less wage for the
worker (wa
ea
falls as ea rises) and is just the same as if the worker pays the tax
for the subsidy. The welfare under the optimal subsidy and under the optimal
depreciation rate would be the same, so actually the government will be indi®erent
between the two tools.
6 Conclusions
Under certain conditions (low exchange rate, high nominal wages) the government
could consider, like Grossman suggests, the depreciation as an alternative tool to
export subsidies.
If the level of the exchange rate depreciation is su±ciently high and the level of the
nominal wage is su±ciently low, a subsidy will do better. But if the level of the
nominal wage is high and the exchange rate is su±ciently low, the governments
could also consider a depreciation as a tool for export promotion.
In the optimal case the two tools are identical for the government. Choosing an
optimal subsidy or choosing an optimal depreciation rate gives the same level of
welfare, so the government is indi®erent between the two tools.
The main di®erences are that the depreciation is not targeted to only one industry,
and its macroeconomic e®ect is not only the decrease of the real wage in the home
country. A depreciation would a®ect all exporting industries and not only the
particular one which the government might want to subsidize, while the subsidy
goes directly to the targeted industry. At the same time through a depreciation
other macroeconomic sectors might be a®ected, while through a subsidy not. If
more di®erences between the two tools are to be found, these aspects should be
analyzed.
In future work the reaction possibilities of the foreign competitor should also be
considered.
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A Appendix
A.1 The Pro¯t Function
Substituting the price px (equation 11) and the demand x (equation 16) in the pro¯t
function of the country A (equation 9) we get:
¼A =
b(2b2(eas ¡ 2wa)eb + c(2aea ¡ ceas + 2cwa)eb + 2bea(cwb + 2aeb))2
2(c2 ¡ 4b2)2e2ae2b
(23)
And if we derive this pro¯t function with respect to s and ea, we get the following
results:
@¼A
@s
=
b(2b2 ¡ c2)(2b2(eas ¡ 2wa)eb + c(2aea ¡ ceas + 2cwa)eb + 2bea(cwb + 2aeb))
(c2 ¡ 4b2)2eaeb
@¼A
@ea
=
2b(2b2 ¡ c2)wa(wb2(eas ¡ 2wa)eb + c(2aea ¡ ceas + 2cwa)eb + 2cwaeb)
(c2 ¡ 4b2)2e3aeb
+
+
2b(2b2 ¡ c2)wa2bea(cwb + 2aeb)
(c2 ¡ 4b2)2e3aeb
and one can observe that if s ¸ 2waea then both @¼A@s and @¼A@ea are positive and that:
@¼A
@ea
@¼A
@s
=
2wa
e2a
A.2 The Utility Function
From the budget constraint equation (1) we get:
m = 2x
wa
ea
¡ sx ¡ pxx ¡ pyy¤
Substituting this into the utility function (equation (1) together with the obtained
values for x (equation (16)), y (equation (17)), px (equation (11)) and py (equation
(12)) we obtain the following result for the utility function:
UA(x; y
¤;m) = U(x; y¤) + m = U(x; y¤) + 2x
wa
ea
¡ sx ¡ pxx ¡ pyy¤ = (24)
=
A
8(b2 ¡ c2)(c2 ¡ 4b2)2e2ae2b
A = b(4c5(eas ¡ 2wa)(¡2aea + ceas ¡ 2cwa)e2b +
17
4b3ceaeb(17c
2wb(eas ¡ 2wa) + 32a2eaeb +
+ac(6eawb + 17easeb ¡ 34waeb)) ¡ 16b5eaeb(4cwb(eas ¡ 2wa)
+a(2eawb + 3easeb ¡ 6waeb) + 4bc3eaeb(¡5c2wb(eas ¡ 2wa) +
+6a2eaeb + ac(6eawb ¡ 7easeb + 14waeb)) + 4b6(28easwae2b ¡
¡28w2ae2b + e2a(4w2b ¡ 7s2e2b)) + b2c2(80ace2awaeb + 104ae2ae2b
+7c2(4e2aw
2
a ¡ 3e2as2e2b + 12easwaeb ¡ 12w2ae2b))
+b4(32a2e2ae
2
b + 16aceaeb(¡6eawb + easeb ¡ 2waeb)
+c2(¡60e2aw2a + 41e2as2e2b ¡ 164easwae2b + 164w2ae2b)))
and di®erentiating this with respect to the subsidy (s) and to the exchange rate depre-
ciation (ea), we get the following results:
@UA
@s
= ¡b[b
4c(¡8aea ¡ 41c(eas ¡ 2wa))eb + 28b6(eas ¡ 2wa)eb
4(b2 ¡ c2)(¡4b2 + c2)2eaeb +
+21b2c4(eas ¡ 2wa)eb + 4c5(aea ¡ ceas + 2cwa)eb
4(b2 ¡ c2)(¡4b2 + c2)2eaeb ¡
¡34b3c2ea(cwb + aeb) + 8b5ea(4cwb + 3aeb) + 2bc4ea(5cwb + 7aeb)
4(b2 ¡ c2)(¡4b2 + c2)2eaeb ]
@UA
@ea
= bwa[b
4c[
8aea + 41c(eas ¡ 2wa)eb ¡ 28b6(eas ¡ 2wa)eb
2(b2 ¡ c2)(¡4b2 + c2)2e3aeb
¡
¡21b2c4(eas ¡ 2wa)eb + 4c5(¡aea + ceas ¡ 2cwa)eb
2(b2 ¡ c2)(¡4b2 + c2)2e3aeb
+
+34b3c2ea(cwb + aeb) ¡ 8b5ea(4cwb + 3aeb) ¡ 2bc4eb(5cwb + 7aeb)
2(b2 ¡ c2)(¡4b2 + c2)2e3aeb
]]
and one can observe that:
@UA
@ea
@UA
@s
=
2wa
e2a
18
A.3 Marginal E®ects
The end results in the previous appendices (A.1 and A.2) can also be derived in a more
simple way:16
After substituting the demand functions (equations (2),(6),(5),(3)) in the utility func-
tions (equation (1) and (4)) and in the pro¯t functions (equation (7) and (8)), these
become a function of the prices px and py. If we derive these function f with respect
to the subsidy and use the result obtained in equation (13), we get:
df
ds
=
df
dpx
dpx
ds
+
df
dpy
dpy
ds
=
=
e2a
2wa
(
df
dpx
dpx
dea
+
df
dpy
dpy
dea
) =
=
e2a
2wa
df
dea
)
df
dea
df
ds
=
2wa
e2a
where f(px; py) = ¼A; ¼B; UA; UB
A.4 Optimal Welfare
If we substitute the optimal subsidy (equation 20) and the optimal exchange rate
(equation 21) in the pro¯t function (equation 23), we obtain the following values for
the optimal pro¯t.
¼A(s
¤) = 2[
¡9ab4ceb + 9ab2c3eb ¡ 2ac5eb + b5(cwb ¡ 8aeb)
b3(12b4 ¡ 9b2c2 + c4)2e2b
+
+bc4(cwb ¡ aeb) + b3c2(¡2cwb + 7aeb)
b3(12b4 ¡ 9b2c2 + c4)2e2b
]2
¼A(e
¤
a) = ¼A(s
¤)
If we substitute the same optimal values in the utility function (equation 24), we obtain
the following results for the optimal utility.
16For this hint I want to thank Leo Kaas from the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS),
Vienna.
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UA(s
¤) = (b + c)[
(36b12w2b + 16a
2c10e2b ¡ 72b11wb(cwb + aeb)
2b3(b ¡ c)(12b4 ¡ 9b2c2 + c4)2e2b
¡
¡16abc9eb(cwb + aeb) + b6c4(¡5c2w2b + 180acwbeb ¡ 682a2e2b)
2b3(b ¡ c)(12b4 ¡ 9b2c2 + c4)2e2b
+
+2b5c5(11c2w2b ¡ 73acwbeb ¡ 84a2e2b) + 4b2c8(c2w2b + 6acwbeb ¡ 34a2e2b)
2b3(b ¡ c)(12b4 ¡ 9b2c2 + c4)2e2b
+
+b10(17c2w2b + 88acwbeb ¡ 28ae2b) ¡ 4b3c7(2c2w2b ¡ 21acwbeb ¡ 23a2e2b)
2b3(b ¡ c)(12b4 ¡ 9b2c2 + c4)2e2b
¡
¡12b7c3(c2w2b ¡ 8acwbeb ¡ 9a2e2b) + 2b9c(19c2w2b + 11acwbeb ¡ 8a2eb2)
2b3(b ¡ c)(12b4 ¡ 9b2c2 + c4)2e2b
+
+b8c2(¡13c2w2b ¡ 146acwbeb + 413a2e2b)
2b3(b ¡ c)(12b4 ¡ 9b2c2 + c4)2e2b
+
+b4c6(¡7c2w2b ¡ 114acwbeb + 449a2e2b)
2b3(b ¡ c)(12b4 ¡ 9b2c2 + c4)2e2b
]
UA(e
¤
a) = UA(s
¤)
Therefore:
WA(s
¤) = WA(e¤a)
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